

# Contesting the Master Narrative

ESSAYS IN SOCIAL HISTORY

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47. Cf. Bazant, "Mexico from Independence to 1867," p. 438.
48. Contrast Mink's *Historical Understanding* with de Certeau's claims that "the reader [is placed] in the position of what is quoted" (*The Writing of History*, p. 95).
49. The Fishers make a similar point: "In practice, *pronunciamientos* often lacked the simplicity of a struggle based on clear-cut principles. What complicated them, and sometimes rendered them intellectually and economically meaningless, was the cynical opportunism of some of the high-ranking military figures of the day" (p. 733, n. 1).
50. The editors gave chapter 25 the title "Quiet after the Cannonading" (pp. 316–23) and express a more cynical view of the whole affair when they state that "nothing was accomplished" (p. 736, n. 1).
51. De Certeau, *The Writing of History*, p. 99.
52. "The historian is no longer a person who shapes an empire. He or she no longer envisages the paradise of a global history. The historian comes to circulate around acquired rationalizations. He or she works in the margins" (ibid., p. 79; author's italics). The difference between nineteenth- and twentieth-century historiography is explained as a shift from "the totalizing function" of history to "a critical experimentation" (p. 80).
53. Lukács, *The Historical Novel*.
54. Cf. Molloy, *At Face Value*.
55. It must be noted that in both of these cases, the "distinguished men" had also been the Calderóns' hosts. During the September 1841 episode, the couple had taken refuge at the Fagoagas' country estate of San Xavier (p. 766, n. 1; p. 506); they had previously visited the Tagles' hacienda in San Angel and "will shortly return to it again" (p. 767, n. 23). Hence the gesture of including them among Mexico's luminaries could be interpreted more as an appreciative token of respect than as a "truth claim" on Mexican nationalism.
56. The passage is worth quoting in full: "It is very much the case, in Mexico at present, that the most distinguished men are those who live most retired — those who have played their part on the arena of public life, have seen the inutility of their efforts in favor of their country, and *have now retreated into the bosom of their families*, where they endeavor to forget public evils in domestic retirement and literary occupation" (pp. 421–22; emphasis mine).
57. In speaking about Santa Anna and Bustamante, Calderón states that "if they met by chance in a drawing room, they would give each other as cordial an *abrazo* (embrace), Mexican fashion, as if nothing had happened" (p. 522).
58. Joan W. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 19–20.
59. "Historical discourse makes a *social identity* explicit, not so much in the way it is 'given' or held as stable, as in the ways it is *differentiated* from a former period or another society" (de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, p. 45; author's italics).
60. Rosario Castellanos, "La mujer mexicana en el siglo XIX," *Mujer que sabe latin* (Mexico City: SepDiana, 1979), p. 160.

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A HISTORY OF THEIR OWN:  
 MONA CAIRD, FRANCES SWINEY,  
 AND FIN DE SIÈCLE FEMINIST  
 FAMILY HISTORY

In *The Creation of Patriarchy*, Gerda Lerner argues that the exclusion of women from formal history has always been one of the chief instruments of their subordination: "Women are essential and central to creating society; they are and always have been actors and agents in history. Women have 'made history,' yet they have been kept from knowing their History and from interpreting history, either their own or that of men. . . . The existence of women's history has been obscured and neglected by patriarchal thought, a fact which has significantly affected the psychology of men and women."<sup>1</sup> In this essay, I will try to show that a similar sense of historical marginality troubled Victorian women and that several late nineteenth-century women writers attempted to extend the inadequate and distortive historical record they found.

These few women were disenfranchised and un-"empowered," their intended audience was relatively small, and many male reformers and socialists ignored their efforts or dismissed them with polite incomprehension and faint praise.<sup>2</sup> Even "revolutionaries," who accepted as a matter of course that wives should not be "subject to their husbands," continued to assume that women were "relative creatures," defined "naturally" through subordinate familial and sexual ties.<sup>3</sup>

Against this double gradient of virulent resistance and polite indifference, some women of the late nineteenth century began to construct an alternative history of women's experience. As they worked, they tended quite naturally to focus on the glaring injustices of contemporary marriage laws, whose historical antecedents and "social construction" they had critically begun to explore.

Marriage was an iron necessity for most Victorian women, who remained under British law in "coverture," subject to their husbands' rule,

legally unable to sign contracts, and deprived of all property rights (including the rights to their own earnings). The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, moreover, had loosened the straitjacket of marriage for *men*—who could now divorce on grounds of adultery—but permitted divorce to *women* only when witnesses attested to bestiality, bigamy, or gross cruelty. A woman who left her husband under any circumstances was guilty of desertion and forfeited any minimal claims she might otherwise have had to common property and financial support. She also lost all right of access to her children, a provision that especially embittered those Victorian feminists and reformists who considered women's primary role to be that of mother and rearer of children. "Wives were dependent upon their husbands to keep their children near them, for wifely insubordination might be punished by a child's being dispatched to live with relatives, apprenticed out to work, or sent away to a school abhorrent to the mother."<sup>4</sup>

None of these sanctions, of course, applied to men. In effect, the "reforms" of the Matrimonial Causes Act permitted men to "put away" women, but not conversely. In this sense, they legalized a sexual double standard and reconfirmed marriage as a form of de facto chattel slavery.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, parliamentary reformers introduced several modest efforts to redress this situation. Property Acts of 1870 and 1882 permitted married women limited rights to separate earnings and to property, and another Matrimonial Causes Act in 1878 gave women the right to appeal for separation on the grounds of repeated assault, though this act continued to deny them any right to divorce. A husband's "conjugal rights," by contrast—his "right" to sexual consent—remained inviolate in all circumstances, even when he carried one or another venereal disease. Only in 1895, after a major court decision in 1891, did the Summary Jurisdiction Act extend the right of appeal for legal separation to wives who had been deserted or physically abused, and "conjugal rights" survived as a category in British law until 1970.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, then, middle-class married women and their male allies in Parliament eked out a few partial rights to escape the most blatant forms of physical and sexual abuse, but women had not yet secured the right to divorce, to remarry, or to retain custody of their children. Moreover, paternalism, not incipient egalitarianism, provided many of the rhetorical pleas for these bills. Two generations had passed since the "reform" of 1857, and the tortuous course of piece-

meal efforts to redress its inequities had long since claimed the minds and efforts of feminists, who were convinced that deep forms of systemic oppression had prevented more substantive forms of social change. Most readers of the scattered essays and reviews that Eleanor Marx, Mona Caird, and Frances Swiney managed to place in *Commonweal*, the *Westminster Review*, and other progressive journals, were well aware of this recent history, and a few at least must have found ample reason to attend to more radical political and historiographical arguments.

Nineteenth-century reformers of every sort typically sought underlying systematic explanations for current social conditions in economics or in history (sometimes both), and "sages" of every persuasion—the authors of *Past and Present*, *Culture and Anarchy*, *Modern Painters*, *The Stones of Venice*, and *The Renaissance*, for example—had rewritten social institutions' "historical" origins to point out various reformist, conservative, or reactionary morals. So it was natural and appropriate for Victorian feminists to seek historical perspectives for their polemical analyses of the situation of contemporary women. Most of the period's standard histories, however—Henry Hallam's *History of the Middle Ages*, John Neale's *History of the Christian Church*, Thomas Macaulay's *Essays*, Thomas Arnold's *History of Rome*, J. R. Greene's *History of the English People*, and even William Prescott's *Histories of Mexico and Peru*, and socialist writings such as Henry Hyndman's *The Historical Basis of Socialism*—focused almost exclusively on the actions of white male rulers, warriors, scholars, artists, and artisans from central and southern Europe. Those unrecognized in the associated political and cultural debates, accordingly, were excluded ("erased") from the period's cultural histories. A historical anthropologist from another planetary system might study these works scrupulously, or the works of many of their twentieth-century successors, for that matter, and find in their pages little evidence that the human species included roughly equal numbers of men and women, and even less evidence that each of the two groups had made comparable contributions to human culture.

Against this orthodoxy, the small but vigorous conventicle of late-Victorian feminist reformers and scholars whom I wish to recall strove to reclaim and redefine women's roles in the creation of a common human past and to locate substantial aspects of a shared cultural and social history in "woman-identified" terms. In the process, they broadened contemporary history and historiography to include studies of family-re-

lationships, material conditions, social life, and cultural assumptions — and they anticipated, therefore, more recent historical practice in significant ways that are themselves now part of women's history.

Some of these late nineteenth-century feminists, such as Agnes and Elizabeth Strickland, were historians of England; others, such as Anna Jameson, were critics of art. Still others, such as Mary Kingsley or Barbara Freire-Marreco, wrote as travelers or anthropologists, in defense of "primitive" or superficially alien modes of thought. A few, such as Vernon Lee, moved gracefully across several genres — in her case, biographical appreciation, essay, historical interpretation, travel narrative, and art criticism. Basic to all their attempts to re-create women's history, however, were the concomitant efforts of a few reformers to present a revisionist history of marriage laws and women's subordination within the family.

The near-exclusion of women from academic establishments, of course, gave feminist reformers less access to the information needed to prepare and mount their "historical" case. But reformist historians of women's common past also faced a further dilemma as they prepared their arguments. On the one hand, they felt an urgent strategic need to argue for changes in self-evidently reasonable and inoffensive terms, a task that might be best served by the presentation of reformist and progressive histories in basically meliorist terms. On the other, only "strong interpretations" and indictments of the evils of women's past repression could even begin to overcome the biases of the existing record and explain their present situation.

Still another problem, related to those mentioned already, was posed by the difficulty of clarifying in firm evidentiary terms *which* of the historical sequences that they wished to retrace *were* "progressive," "static," or "regressive." By convention, Victorian histories often recorded uniformly "progressive" evolutionary patterns or pointed to (allegedly) uncontroversial and originary sources of ancestral pride. However Darwin himself saw his account of biological origins, for example, assorted Darwinian social historians found in it a mighty fortress of orderly progression, dictated by rational laws and manifested in naturally ordained distinctions between sexes and races. Similarly, Westermarck's patriarchal *History of Human Marriage* imposed on history the development of a pan-European pattern of male family governance and identified this pattern with the progression of morality and social order.<sup>5</sup>

Feminist historians thus had to decide whether to impugn the con-

clusions of such a metanarrative, its premises, or its methodological lines of putative inference. The works of revisionist male historiographies offered partial prototypes for all three.

#### ANTECEDENT MALE FEMINIST HISTORICISM

Several reformist historicists had evoked aspects of an alternatively idealized past as precursors of desirable future conditions. In fact, the two great godfathers of nineteenth-century feminism — J. J. Bachofen, in *Das Mutterrecht* (1861), and Friedrich Engels, in *Der Ursprung des Familie, des Privateigentums, und der Staates* (*The origin of the family, private property, and the state*) (1871) — both imagined an archaic, prepatriarchal state, in which women enjoyed more determining influence (Bachofen) and greater sexual freedom (Engels). Bachofen believed the evolution from an earlier, more-inclusive matriarchal *Mutterrecht* to its present patriarchal and individualist successor was regrettable but inevitable, but he also believed that an ideal society to come would restore the lost cultural benignity of the earlier matriarchal epoch:

At the lowest, darkest stage of human existence [mother-child love was] the only light in the moral darkness. . . . Raising her young, the woman learns earlier than the man to extend her loving care beyond the limits of the ego to another creature. . . . Woman at this stage is the repository of all culture, of all benevolence, of all devotion, of all concern for the living and grief for the dead. . . . We find the matriarchal peoples distinguished by rectitude, piety, and culture; we see women serving as conscientious guardians of the mystery, of justice and peace. . . . Seen in this light, matriarchy becomes a sign of cultural progress, a source and guarantee of its benefits, and a necessary period in the education of mankind, and hence the fulfillment of a natural law which governs peoples as well as individuals.<sup>6</sup>

Bachofen's notions of women's essential contributions to the earliest periods of human history of religion and culture focused primarily on woman-as-mother, unlike those of Engels and Eleanor Marx, who viewed women primarily as sexual and companionate partners, respectively. Bachofen also offered some original insights — that different relationships between children and parents might emerge in families organized by mothers, for example, rather than by legally dominant fathers, and that maternally organized communal societies might foster a different and more inclusive ethic: "Whereas the paternal principle is inherently

restrictive, the maternal principle is universal; the paternal principle implies limitation to definite groups, but the maternal principle, like the life of nature, knows no barriers. *The idea of motherhood produces a sense of universal fraternity among all men, which dies with the development of paternity*" (80) (emphasis added).

Bachofen's accounts merit further interest for their strong association of women with the origins of human culture, their recognition that alternate family structures may foster less-competitive modes of behavior, and their avowals of a need to achieve (or recover) a "religion of humanity." Against the background of Bachofen's insights, finally, Engels's "matriarchy" can be seen for what it is: not a matriarchy at all but rather a matrilinear patriarchal agricultural society, whose vaguely adumbrated ethos included few norms for organization or decision making beyond general appeals to "community."

Engels's *Origin* myth, similarly, offered an ostensibly historicist argument that women's oppression lay rooted in an allegedly reversible sequence of past events. In one now-famous formulation, for example, he asserted that the transition from matriarchal communal tribalism to bourgeois patriarchy marked "the world-historical defeat of the female sex," and he considered the basic forms of class oppression to be isomorphic in certain respects with those of women by men. Only a society no longer based on capitalist oppression, he claimed, would free men and women to experience the happiness of sexual choice. The motive force of women's emancipation, however, would be a communist revolution, to be led principally by proletarian and bourgeois men.<sup>7</sup>

Essentially, Engels presented in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* an impassioned defense of sexual freedom for both sexes, marred by a notable lack of interest in the central role of child-raising by "the Family" and by a certain irrationalism about the consequences and preconditions of such freedom — for example, when he remarked that group marriage is "the form of family in which whole groups of men and whole groups of women mutually possess one another, and which leaves little room for jealousy" (31). Nor did Engels pause to ask what life in his hypothetical matrilinear society might really have been like, above all, for women as well as for men. There is no mention of women's conduct of tribal government, for example, or their contributions to religion or art, or their shared responsibility for war, or their relationships with their partners, or — of manifest importance within a matriarchy, after all — their children and each other (little literal or metaphorical "sister-

hood" here). Since Engels — like Karl Marx, August Bebel, Eleanor Marx, and almost all other nineteenth-century socialists — professed to find all forms of homosexuality utterly abhorrent, gay and lesbian ties in the new/old order of "sexual freedom" are also nonexistent.

Other simplistic aspects of Engels's analyses remained to haunt the history of feminism and socialist theory. His historically inaccurate assumptions that male domination occurred only in capitalist and bourgeois civil societies wrongly suggested that the abolition of certain narrowly defined industrial hierarchies would liberate women from sexist subordination, in itself and as a matter of course. Such assumptions ignored hidden patterns of persistent violence against women — domestic abuse and rape, for example — and other patterns of behavior that lack simple economic motivation, whatever their underlying causes. What analysis of economic exploitation, for example, could explain why men of all classes attacked their wives and children, but their wives and children seldom attacked them? Why, moreover, on Engels's account, were industrial working women paid half or less of the wages earned by their male counterparts? Why did male workers often justify these inequities?

In summary, few nineteenth-century male theorists of family origins, with the partial exception of Bachofen, whatever their ostensible ideology, discerned any connection between rigid gender divisions and (for example) recurrent forms of individual and communal violence. Given these precedents, it is noticeable how few of the late nineteenth-century women who attempted to review women's history — even Eleanor Marx, whose *The Woman Question* (1887) was directly indebted to Engels — chose to appeal to a more sexually egalitarian idealized past. Perhaps, like many later historians and anthropologists, these women reformers doubted the evidence for its existence. Unlike the male socialist-feminists, these writers were not centrally concerned with extensions of women's (hetero)sexual freedom (Eleanor Marx here is an exception). Rather, one might compare their approach with that of the contemporary feminist Catharine MacKinnon, in her 1989 polemic, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*.<sup>8</sup> They sought liberation in the forms that seemed most immediately relevant to them and therefore concentrated most of their force in sustained attacks against the legal systems that bound women and against reinforced forms of systemic and systematic violence — coerced marriage, prostitution, assault, rape, and murder — inflicted on women with relative impunity throughout history. Despite many political differences, these feminists also agreed that traditional

European marriage, "bourgeois" and otherwise, was a cross-cultural, cross-temporal disaster, largely invariant under the stages or economic bases of the social order that sanctioned and defined it.

**ANTECEDENT WOMEN'S HISTORIES: SYDNEY OWENSON, ANNIE BESANT, AND ELEANOR MARX**

For these writers' aggrieved histories of the continuing economic and legal oppression of women, several partial earlier Victorian precedents would have been available. The first of these texts was Sydney Owenson/Lady Morgan's 1840 *Woman and Her Master*, a fiery work that deserves to be better known. Owenson/Morgan is now remembered chiefly as the author of a much earlier work, *The Wild Irish Girl* (1806), and her growing blindness delayed completion of *Woman and Her Master* for many years, so that it seems a work displaced from its original radical late Enlightenment context.

In essence, Owenson found in history a sustained conspiracy to limit women's social influence: "To limit and pervert this agency has been the great object of the social and legal institutions of imperfect civilisation; to give a full development to the design of nature, by better arrangements, will be the crowning labour of man's earthly warfare, his triumph over himself."<sup>9</sup> Her response to this conspiracy was to record women's achievements in the face of male social hegemony and personal domination, and her narrative focuses primarily on the accomplishments of distinguished women (Esther, Aspasia, Zenobia, Paulina). Owenson had no further agenda to unite women in resistance to their generic subordination, but she (unlike Engels) did present some women as exceptional historical agents, not merely as passive victims. She also anticipated the pride of such later feminists as Mona Caird and Frances Swiney in a traduced history of women's accomplishment: "Alluded to, rather as an incident than a principal in the chronicles of nations, [woman's] influence, which cannot be denied, has been turned into a reproach; her genius, which could not be concealed, has been treated as a phenomenon, when not considered as monstrosity!" . . . [Yet] wherever woman has been, there has she left the track of her humanity, to mark her passage."<sup>10</sup>

Other dissident antecedents for reformist historians of the 1890s included Annie Besant, author of *Marriage As It Was, As It Is, and As It Should Be* (1879), and Eleanor Marx, whose work *The Woman Question* appeared in 1887.<sup>11</sup> Both attacked the gross inequities of women's em-

ployment, denounced the repression of women's sexuality and right to raise their own children, and examined the psychological consequences of the denial of sexual autonomy.

Besant's bitter review of the injustices of marriage law anticipated Mona Caird's later indictment of women's legally enforced subordination and brought into sharp relief origins of marital "traditions" in religious and legal brutality. She dryly summarized a few such traditions, for example, as follows:

Among some barbarous nations the winning of a bride is still harsher: the bridegroom rushes into the father's house, knocks the maiden down, picks up her senseless body, flings it over his shoulder, and runs for his life; he is pursued by the youth of the village, pelted with stones, sticks, &c., and has to win his wife by sheer strength and swiftness. In some tribes this is a mere marriage ceremony, a survival from the time when the fight was a real one, and amongst ourselves the slipper thrown after the departing bridegroom and bride is a direct descendant of the heavier missiles thrown with deadly intent thousands of years ago by our remote ancestors. (6)

In anticipation that some contemporary readers might reply that Judeo-Christian doctrine had significantly tempered such abuses, Besant briefly reviewed the relevant Old and New Testament precedents and precepts:

After the destruction of Benjamin, as related in Judges xxi, it was arranged that the survivors should possess themselves of women as wives by force and fraud: "Lie in wait in the vineyards, and see and behold if the daughters of Shiloh come out to dance in dances, then come ye out of the vineyards, and catch you every man his wife. . . . And the children of Benjamin did so, and took their wives according to their number, of them that danced, whom they caught." (Judges xxi. 20, 21, 23, 6)

. . . both the New Testament and the Church have insisted on the inferiority of the female sex: "the husband is the head of the wife" (Eph. v. 23); "wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands" (Col. iii. 18); "your women . . . are commanded to be under obedience" (I Cor. xiv. 34); "ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands . . . even as Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him lord, whose daughters ye are as long as ye do well." (I Pet. iii. 1, 6)

Besant concluded that redress could come only from open opposition to such institutionalized forms of domestic oppression — that is, the complete rejection of marriage in any form:

I take leave to think that women have a fairer chance of happiness and comfort in an unlegalised than in a legal marriage. . . . If all the men and women who disapprove of the present immoral laws would sturdily *and openly* oppose them; if those who desire to unite their lives, but are determined not to submit to the English marriage laws, would publicly join hands, making such a declaration as is here suggested, the unlegalized marriage would be recognized as a dignified and civilized substitute for the old brutal and savage traditions. (36)

The only woman-authored socialist-feminist treatise of the period was Eleanor Marx's *The Woman Question* (1887), nominally coauthored with her husband, Edward Aveling. Revised and expanded from an earlier review for *Commonweal* of August Bebel's *Woman and Socialism*, *The Woman Question* showed markedly greater interest in and sympathy for contemporary literature by and about women than earlier socialist-feminist treatises by male authors, and partially exempted two major forms of female solidarity from the usual charges of mere "bourgeois reformism": the campaign for the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Act and the movement to extend wider educational opportunities to women.<sup>12</sup>

Also absent from male-authored feminist treatises was *The Woman Question's* critique of the psychological harm inflicted by several of women's subordinate roles, including their mandated passivity in courting and sexual behavior: "We suggest as another wrong to women the rigorous social rule that from man only must come the first proffer of affection, the proposal for marriage" (18). More significantly, Marx argued even more pointedly than Besant that women must organize themselves to change their collective future: "Both the oppressed classes, women and the immediate producers, must understand that their emancipation will come from themselves. Women will find allies in the better sort of men, as the labourers are finding allies among the philosophers, artists, and poets. But the one has nothing to hope from man as a whole, and the other has nothing to hope from the middle class as a whole" (15).

In another passage, Marx denounces the pervasive effects of ordinary women's double drudgery: "The man, worn out as he may be by labour,

has the evening in which to do nothing. The woman is occupied until bedtime comes. Often with young children her toil goes far into, or all through the night" (19).

Most impassioned, however, are *The Woman Question's* attacks on prudery, and pointed demands for (hetero)sexual education. There must be free discussion of "the sexual question in all its bearing," by men and women "looking frankly into each other's faces" (23). "There can never be a time when falsehood should be taught about any function of the body" (21), for "with the false shame and false secrecy, against which we protest, goes the unhealthy separation of the sexes that begins as children quit the nursery, and only ends when the dead men and women are laid in the common earth" (22). Such remarks have the sting of felt observation and immediate response; they go beyond Engels's and Bachofen's judicious generalities.

Like Besant's *Marriage*, *The Woman Question* also advocates female independence, a full range of creative occupations, and an ideal of intellectual companionship in heterosexual unions. In one remark, which recalls several passages from John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor's *The Subjection of Woman* (1869), Marx invokes an ideal of mental as well as emotional fellowship between the sexes:

The highest ideal seems to be the complete, harmonious, lasting blending of two human lives. Such an ideal . . . needs at least four things. These are love, respect, intellectual likeness, and command of the necessities of life. . . . Intellectual likeness. The same education for men and women; the bringing up of these twain side by side, until they join hands at last, will ensure a greater degree of this. That objectionable product of capitalism, Tennyson's "In Memoriam" young woman, with her "I cannot understand, I love," will be a myth. Every one will have learnt that there can be no love without understanding. (27–28)

The passage's wistful tone marks its visionary counterfactualty, and it bears observation that the period's only woman-authored socialist-feminist treatise pointedly idealized mental and sexual companionship in marriage, rather than the parenting of children. Besant, by contrast, firmly advocated children's rights to freedom from violence and coercion, and Besant and Mona Caird, both mothers, were more attentive to the social implications of family life.

**MONA CAIRD'S THE MORALITY OF MARRIAGE:  
FEMINIST EGALITARIANISM AND THE "NEW WOMAN"**

Two of the period's more comprehensive attempts to rewrite women's history were Mona Caird's *The Morality of Marriage and Other Essays on the Status and Destiny of Woman* (1897), which advocated a strong form of feminist egalitarianism, and Frances Swiney's *The Awakening of Women* (1897), which mingled a fierce sense of women's potential contributions to society with an occasionally rather bizarre assortment of evolutionary scientism, mystical and anti-erotic Protestant Christianity, and preachments of female and Anglo-Saxon supremacy. To her credit, Swiney also attempted to provide a cross-cultural narrative of women's past achievements, and succeeded, in fact, in providing one of the earliest comparative accounts in English of women's lives in Europe, Asia, and India.

Caird's *The Morality of Marriage* devotes five chapters to a historical account of women's position in the family. She draws freely on other nineteenth-century historians and anthropologists (Tylor, Westermarck, Reclus) to cite vastly divergent systems of (alleged) tribal regulation, inheritance, and family structure, and she advocates skeptical suspension of judgment about any one among them. Like Owenson, she was also attracted to evidence that women may have been honored in past societies and that their actual contributions throughout history may well have been equal to or superior to those of men. With pleasure, for example, she records the anarchist ethnologist Elie Reclus's description of the society of Indian Nairs, in which "proud and haughty warrior though he be, the Nair cheerfully obeys his mother. . . . Formerly, in grand ceremonies, the reigning prince himself yielded precedence to his eldest daughter, and of course recognized still more humbly the priority of his mother, before whom he did not venture to seat himself until she had given him permission."<sup>13</sup>

Following lines of argument pioneered by Owenson, August Bebel, and Reclus, Caird also set forth her claim that women were the originators and preservers of early civilizations:

Researches of recent years have brought to light the remarkable fact that woman, as the first agriculturalist, the first herbalist, the initiator of the art of medicine, the discoverer of the most ancient of human lore, is, as Karl Pearson says, "the pioneer of all civilisation." So far from being the receptive and adaptive creature of popular imagination, she, in fact, holds the position of leader and originator in all the

arts of industry: the prophetess and teacher of humanity from the beginning of its upward career. (70)

A major component of her argument, however, remains her sustained appeal to cultural plurality as a source of enlightened — we might say "deconstructive" — skepticism. A radical relativist, Caird adduced with evident delight customs that contravened a wide range of Victorian assumptions about "natural" behavior: societies in which family ties are based on the bond between nephew and uncle, for example; or in which the families of women buy them husbands, who then are granted a status somewhere between that of kinspeople and chattel. The more eccentric and improbable these examples were, of course, the more readily they supported Caird's thesis that "there is, perhaps, no set of ideas so fundamental that human beings have not somewhere, at some period of the world, lived in direct contradiction to them" (23).

History thus became for Caird in part a pastiche of "socially constructed" oddities, but it also provided a nearly blank tablet of human desires, on which the living may write a better future:

In short, we are forced either to ignore all that is now known about the primitive habits and ideas of mankind, or to resign ourselves to surrender any pet theory about "human nature" which we may happen to cherish. And having submitted to that painful sacrifice, we are rewarded by finding another belief in the place of the former one, which is, after all, more inspiring. We discover that "human nature" need not be a perpetual obstacle to change, to hope, and to progress, as we have hitherto persistently made it; but that it is the very instrument or material through which that change, that hope, and that progress may be achieved. (40)

Several of Caird's most persuasive arguments, however, were *not* relativist. She clearly appealed to an implicit and underlying sense of personal and distributive justice — which she presumably hoped would, after all, be an "essential" part of protean "human nature" — in her bitter account of the ways in which English marriage laws have systematically and historically kept women in economic bondage. In these pages of the work, history suddenly ceased for her to be a random collection of inconsistent curiosa, as she reviews the systematic rapine of women's labor by legal institutions, which effected monopolies of male power. Here Caird's feminist history, like that of Besant, expressed pure anger that



such clear and pervasive forms of injustice have endured for so long, cloaked by customs that sanctify desire for domination and naked greed.

She traced the familiar patriarchal notion that a woman is her husband's property, for example, to the prerogatives of the Roman *paterfamilias*, who "handed her over to the power of her husband, who then had the same rights of punishment — nay, of life and death, which the father had previously enjoyed. He might even sell her into slavery" (41). . . . "In ancient history the woman has been under the power of the father; modern history shows her under that of the husband" (47). Following Mary Wollstonecraft and Harriet Taylor, Caird denounced the historical antecedents of patriarchy in the "right of capture": "The point to be made clear is that paternal rights take their rise in the ownership of the mother, and not in the relationship to the children or the support which the father may afford them. These latter circumstances are now merely employed as a justification of the anomaly that she who bears the children is deprived of full rights regarding them" (50). . . . "Woman originally became the property of man by right of capture; now the wife is his by right of law" (72).<sup>14</sup>

Interestingly, the Scottish Caird considered the medieval Roman Catholic Church somewhat more favorably inclined to women than its puritanical Protestant successors. Along with many other Victorian progressives, such as John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, Walter Pater, and Vernon Lee, she also considered chivalric ideals a relatively benign mitigation of the "law of the stronger" and found little of value in the dour clericalism of the Protestant Reformation. Especially offensive to her was what she believed to have been Luther's view that marriage is a necessary concession to "evil" desires: "Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Father of Evil himself, in his most inspired moments[,] could have devised a means of placing marriage on a more degrading basis than that on which it was placed, of malice aforethought, by the great reformer" (79). She cited with particular disgust Melancthon's grim injunction to women, to bear children until they drop: "If a woman becomes weary of bearing children, that matters not: let her only die from bearing, she is there to do it" (85).

Caird also reacted skeptically to claims that the Reformation had a softening effect on family relations: "The woman's position, as established at this epoch, was one of great degradation. . . . A man might indeed be a tyrant in his own home, in the devout belief that he was doing

no more than exercising his just rights, nay, performing his bounden duties as ruler of the household" (81).

More significantly, Caird also examined two other issues that have continued to preoccupy feminists in the succeeding century: the social origins of prostitution and the rigid enforcement of double standards in sexual behavior. In the Renaissance, for example, arose "that professional class of women, who were at once imperiously demanded and sternly punished by the community, their offence being their response to the demand. . . . The arrangement was more than convenient. It secured from a friendless class enormous services (or at least it secured that which society demanded); it afforded the woman who had become the legal property of one man, the satisfaction of looking down on a position which she was able to consider more despicable than her own — wherefore, has never yet been explained — and thus helped to reconcile her to a social arrangement which told so heavily against her. . . . Anyone who realises the conditions of life at that time, cannot fail to understand what must have been the fate of such unfriended women" (82–83).

Caird's parenthetical remark ("wherefore, has never yet been explained") makes it clear that she also shared one radical view of late nineteenth-century socialist-feminists: marriage is legally sanctioned and regulated *prostitution* (and not, say, legally regulated reproduction of human capital): "A religious rite or a legal form is, for a woman, to mark the whole difference between irredeemable sin and absolute duty. From this significant fact it is easy to infer the nature of the married woman's position, and to see that — unless human laws have some supernatural power of sanctification — her position is, *per se*, degrading" (87).

In a bold, if somewhat mixed, metaphorical leap, Caird also reclaimed for women the historical significance of their unrecorded labor: "And thus, while women were ignored in the obvious course of human affairs, and history soared above their bowed heads, the material of that very history was forming under their hands. In those shrouded homes, where the minds of children received their life-long stamp from the mothers of the race, all the determining elements of human sentiment were initiated and fashioned" (85). Some aspects of her assertion are familiar, of course ("The hand that rocks the cradle . . ."). But it also anticipates later theoretical claims that "the early modern subject" was modeled in the lives of women and that, in Gerda Lerner's formulation, "it is inconceivable for anything ever to have taken place in the world in

which women were not involved, except if they were prevented from participation through coercion and repression" (228).

Caird's final summary briefly reviews several aspects of her indictment: "The result of such a bird's-eye view is not cheering . . . :— strict marriage, prostitution, . . . commercialism and competition in the most exaggerated forms, the subjection of women, . . . their . . . purchase by men, under differing names and conditions through society; and finally, the (. . . consequent) dual moral standard for the two sexes" (91). Her analysis is not without its middle-class liberal limitations, of course — a lingering problem for her intellectual descendants, us included. Her text gives little attention, for example, to the routine physical drudgery performed by poor women, and she makes no explicit mention of the extent to which sexual "purchase" included the right to inflict venereal disease — both omissions were addressed by Swiney. In contrast to Bachofen and Owenson, however, this "new woman" of the 1890s *did* envision a looser form of (heterosexual) social bonding than that of the nuclear family: "In a still distant condition of society, it is probable that unions may exist outside the law but inside society; men and women caring only for the real bond between them, and treating as of quite minor importance the artificial or legal tie" (125).

One final feature also separates Caird's discussion from most of its antecedents, with the clear exception of Besant: her explicit concern for "the children of the future." In the chapter which bears this title, however, she argues that only competent, eager, and presumably at-times-paid child-minders should take over the job: "Some day a mother's affection will show itself, not in industrious self-sacrifice, which reduces her to a pulpy nonentity, feeble in body and mind, and generally ends in bringing her child to a similar condition; but in a resolve to take the full advantage of all that science is busily providing, for those who will accept her bounties" (156).

Caird's class standing may have prevented her from considering the possibility of collective child care here, and some personal distaste for the job may be reflected by her apparent failure to consider alternative constructive models for childrearing by adults of both sexes. Her evasion of this issue is shared by other Victorian advocates of divorce reform, however, who were less than eager to confront the genuinely vexing moral issues involved for children as well as parents. Also, like other Victorian reformers of both sexes, she was simply unable to envision a world in which fathers might willingly rear children. I only find it disap-

pointing that someone who understood so clearly the degrading effects of legally enforced subordination and abuse on *women* should have sidestepped the implications of *patria potestas* for the development of much more dependent and physically vulnerable *children*.

#### FRANCES SWINEY'S *THE AWAKENING OF WOMEN*: SEPARATISM AND FEMALE SUPERIORITY

Frances Swiney's *The Awakening of Women: Or, Women's Part in Evolution* was more simplistic and less consistent than Besant's stringent treatise or Caird's polemical tour de force, but it also offered a more extended overview and valuation of women's underreported contributions to several cultures and pioneered some lines of thought that have reappeared in the work of later feminists.<sup>15</sup> Swiney prefaced her account of women's history with some bold claims about women's putative physiology and psychology: "[The] testimony of women's 'superhuman' powers is exceedingly valuable in conjunction with the advanced scientific opinion, that the child and the woman approximate nearest to the higher line of evolution; they foreshadow, as it were, the future development of the race" (38); "it is remarkable that European women are much more susceptible to occult influences than men" (37); "the progress of the human race is dependent on the development of . . . woman to be the embodiment of that love which compassed the universe, and is the ultimate goal of all creation in the cosmic plan" (48).

In radical contrast to Besant, Caird, and Eleanor Marx, Swiney saw no reason for women to demand more sexual freedom, for "they have not to battle with fierce and almost uncontrollable passions; they can, serenely and unmoved, go on their appointed way, undisturbed by the lower instincts of human nature" (67); "marriage is necessary to woman only as it affects the reproduction of the species — her organism is not dependent on it; and it is probable that as woman develops more and more her intellectual faculties . . . , she will evince an ever-increasing repugnance to marriage, as a mere outlet of animal passion, and only enter on so holy and mysterious a bond under certain well-defined restrictions and conditions" (105).

Despite Swiney's apparent separatism, the commentator Ignota characterized *The Awakening of Women* in the *Westminster Review* as a book "written by a woman for women . . . [which] may none the less be read with great profit by every earnest-minded man desirous of comprehending the inner meaning of the 'woman movement.' Every such per-

son, however much he may differ on special points, will find ample material for searching thought in each of its 300 suggestive pages."<sup>16</sup> A more-critical writer for the *Englishwoman's Review* noted some several of the work's apparent inconsistencies and remarked that the reader might be tempted

to close the book in despair, though, after all, that would be doing it an injustice. . . . It inclines too much to the very questionable practice of regarding men and women as two distinct species, losing sight of the fact that they are both primarily human beings, with a good stock of qualities in common, and able to supplement each other out of those wherein they differ. . . . Mrs. Swiney is the first writer we have met with who has seriously maintained that woman is complete by herself and has no need of man, while he cannot get on without her.<sup>17</sup>

More useful than *The Awakening's* potpourri of mysticism, scientism, transcendentalism, and anti-eroticism is its attempt to provide a survey of women's historical roles in chapters titled "Woman as the Wife," "Woman as the Mother," "Woman as the Sister," "Woman as the Worker in the Past," and "Woman's Work in the Present and the Future." Swiney's loosely organized account of women's labor throughout the centuries follows Reclus, Caird, and American anthropologist Otis Mason's ascriptions of a high degree of creativity to early women:

Primitive woman was always practical; . . . but usefulness of aim did not deter her from exercising her sense of the beautiful, or dull her powers of observation. As a close student of nature, in touch with all the treasures of earth, and wood, and field, she instinctively imitated natural forms, curves, colours, and combinations; and thus toiling for duty's sake, she produced beauty. It says also much for primitive woman's intuitive love of the beautiful, her artistic perception of colour and form, that geometric designs, emanating from her fertile brain thousands of years ago, are still copied, . . . and her early decorative efforts are in the present day of priceless value, as exemplars for reproduction. (204-5)

Swiney's account also reviews issues of sexuality: the high incidence of prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, and the implicit legal sanction of rape. Some of Swiney's beliefs were less reformist than Caird's (she opposed the liberalization of divorce laws, for example), but her summary of Victorian laws and social behavior is marked by caustic at-

tention to detail. She notes, for example, the limited information on venereal diseases available to women, the imprisonment of adolescent girls for acts that carry no penalty for their adult partners, and the absence in England and Ireland of a legal proscription against incest. Of the parliamentary opposition to women's suffrage on the part of members who refuse to consider the social origins of prostitution, she remarks that such Honourable Members are "willing rather to drive a thousand more women on the streets, victims to men's passions, than see one woman efficiently and intelligently filling a public office, taking upon herself the responsibilities of citizenship, or earning a competency in any trade or profession" (257).

Swiney's cross-cultural interests, similarly, are undercut by her belief that "Anglo-Saxon women" have been "the pioneers bearing the banner of progress into the Land of Promise" (221), but her volume does devote considerable attention to the past and present situation of female workers in many regions of the world: Belgium, Scandinavia, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Germany, Russia, Turkey, New Zealand, the United States, India, China, and Japan. Swiney is also unusual — at least among non-Marxists — in her assumption that a history of women should view them primarily as workers and consider their labor in cross-cultural ways.

Swiney's appeals to women's alleged pacific nature and "spirituality" offer a somewhat "essentialist" early prototype of what might be called the Greenham-Common view of social progress. She mounts a genteel but sustained attack on the psychological origins of war, and her appeals to women's suffrage as a means toward the abolition of conscription and militarism echo ironically against the fact that Parliament finally granted women the vote in 1918 in part as a reward for their support of "the war-effort":

Women will plead for arbitration between nations; they will be the universal peacemakers: they will bring into public administration that element of stability, of sterling moral worth, of justice and equality, upon which alone depends a nation's true progress. . . . The matriarchal rule will be re-established, not on the crude and primitive lines of the pre-historic races, but in accordance with the unconscious evolution, physical, mental, and spiritual, of mankind in general.

The time will come when men will be considered too valuable and essential to the well-being of the industrial community to be offered as targets for marksmen. (301)

In partial solidarity here with the male socialist feminists Engels and Bebel, Swiney thus equated the freedom of women with abstractly formulated advances in egalitarianism and international social justice.

It is also interesting to contrast the works of Besant, Eleanor Marx, Caird, and Swiney with those of contemporary male historians of the family. These male writers were noticeably more concerned with exhibiting the family as an alleged microcosm of the (hierarchically organized) state, for better or for worse. They took pains, therefore, to assimilate the putatively parallel bases of these two "governments" in law and authoritative modes for the establishment of paternity, ownership, and transmission of property. Understandably, woman polemicists were little attracted to such forms of "legitimacy." It was clear to them that the traditional family's basis lay more in naked violence and institutionally sanctioned forms of gender oppression, repression of female sexual desire and choice, and unacknowledged exploitation of female labor.

The more sympathetic male historians tended to focus on recriptions of kinship, property rights, and (de)control of female sexuality, but women reformers were more concerned with forms of physical, personal, and legal autonomy, the power to escape abuse, and rights to shared control of their children. Their accounts of family origins were sketchier, more "pointillist," and more remote from original sources than those of their counterparts in the (essentially all-male) academy, but they brought a fresh breath of living reality to the search for historical "truth" in the ossuaries of past legal systems.

Above all, they offered mordant analyses of the physical and psychological mechanisms through which men enforced women's conformity; relatively blunt accounts of prostitution, sexual violence, and sexually transmitted disease; and much more accurate and differentiated descriptions of the realities of women's "domestic" labor. In their concern with the violent prescriptions and proscriptions of gender roles, in fact, it may have been such Victorian feminists as Caird and Swiney — not Marx or Engels — who provided their century's most "materialist" account of family history.

#### AFTER THE VICTORIANS

Later feminists have, of course, corrected, extended, and deepened the arguments of Caird, Swiney, and their predecessors. At the end of the Victorian era, for example, the feminist classicist Jane Harrison's *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1903) provided the first full

account of female deities in Greek religion, thus confirming and expanding Bachofen's view that the basis of Greek culture had been matrilinear.<sup>18</sup> Twentieth-century works such as Elizabeth Gould Davis's *The First Sex* (1971), Heide Gottner-Abendrott's *Matriarchal Mythology in Former Times and Today* (1987), and Rita Gross's *Feminism and Religion* (1996) have continued to assert the ethical primacy of female-oriented religious traditions.<sup>19</sup> Along a different ideological axis, the work of socialist-feminists such as Michele Barrett or Alison Jaggar remains central to contemporary feminist thought.<sup>20</sup> "Single-shift" explanations of the sort propounded by Bachofen and Engels are no longer in fashion, but contemporary anthropologists have partially confirmed the nineteenth-century reformist view of Caird and Swiney, among others, that women were better situated in many early societies, though they hold militarization of social life rather than the rise of private ownership more responsible for the growth of sexual stratification and oppression.

Cross-cultural comparisons of women's economic situation, similarly, now form the basis of the expanding field of feminist anthropology. Radical assertions of the violence inscribed in seemingly gender-neutral laws have also reappeared in the works of sexuality and reproductive feminists such as Susan Brownmiller and Catharine MacKinnon.<sup>21</sup> MacKinnon, for example, argues in quasi-Swineyan fashion that "the state appears most relentless in imposing the male point of view when it comes closest to achieving its highest formal criterion of distanced aperspectivity. When it is most ruthlessly neutral, it is most male; when it is most sex blind, it is most blind to the sex of the standard being applied. . . . But the legitimacy of existing law is based on force at women's expense" (248, 249).

Assertions of separate traditions of women's spirituality, moreover, have long since become a recognized countercurrent in the work of such contemporary theologians as Mary Daly, Susan Griffin, and Carol Christ.<sup>22</sup> The proto-feminist-pacifist arguments of Swiney, finally, have found refinement and reflection in activist-ecological writers such as Jean Elshtain and Carolyn Merchant.<sup>23</sup>

Caird, Swiney, and other late nineteenth-century women historians of the family, then, focused firmly and clearly on issues of violence, power, and forced labor, and their opposition to standard assumptions of Victorian family history and its preoccupation with legal contracts, ascriptions of paternity, and sexual regulation was clear. However delayed

subsequent recognition of their individual contributions has been, no one acquainted with the premises of contemporary gender studies will fail to recognize more recent echoes of these reformers' mordant distaste for idealized representation of the Victorian middle-class family. As a partial result of their efforts, few who read these words would now assert that the legally mandated, biologically bounded nuclear family is the only possible nexus in potential social constructions of sexuality, gender, kinship, and affectional ties.

#### NOTES

1. Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 5–6.
2. Only a few reviews of Caird and Swiney's works, for example, appeared in such socialist and Progressive periodicals as *Commonweal*, *Justice*, and *To-day*.
3. For a discussion of Victorian views of women, see Robin Sheets, Elizabeth Helsing, and William Veeder, *The Woman Question: Society and Literature in Britain* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
4. Margaret Shanley, *Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850–1895* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 159. Other treatments of Victorian marriage and property law may be found in Lee Holcombe, *Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women's Property Law in Nineteenth-Century England* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); Allen Horstman, *Victorian Divorce* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985); Pat Jalland, *Women, Marriage, and Politics, 1860–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Susan Kingsley Kent, *Sex and Suffrage in Britain, 1860–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Joan Perkin, *Women and Marriage in Nineteenth-Century England* (London: Routledge, 1989).
5. Edward Westermarck, *A History of Human Marriage* (London: Macmillan, 1891).
6. J. J. Bachofen, *Myth, Religion, and Mother Right: Selected Writings of J. J. Bachofen*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 79, 91.
7. Eleanor Burke Leacock, introduction to *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, by Friedrich Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1942). For critiques of Engels from a feminist viewpoint, see Jane Sayers, Mary Evans, and Nanneke Redcliff, eds., *Engels Revisited: New Feminist Essays* (London: Tavistock, 1987); Lise Vogel, *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983); and Florence and William Boos, "Victorian Socialist-Feminism and William Morris's *News from Nowhere*," *Nineteenth-Century Contexts* 14, no. 1 (1990): 3–32.
8. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
9. *Woman and Her Master* (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1840), p. 201.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 21; Lydia Child's *Brief History of the Condition of Women in Various*

*Ages and Nations* (Boston: C. S. Francis, 1854) also provided a pioneering cross-cultural approach to women's history.

11. Eleanor Marx and Edward Aveling, *The Woman Question* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1887), reprinted in Joachim Muller and Edith Schotte, eds., *Thoughts on Women and Society* (New York: International Publishers, 1987), pp. 21, 24.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

13. *The Morality of Marriage and Other Essays on the Status and Destiny of Woman* (London: George Redway, 1897), pp. 27–28. Future references to this edition are indicated by page number or numbers within parentheses. See also Lyn Pykett, "The Cause of Women and the Course of Fiction: The Case of Mona Caird," in Christopher Parker, ed., *Gender Roles and Sexuality in Victorian Literature*, pp. 128–42 (Aldershot, Hants: Scolar Press, 1995). Pykett argues that "Caird's novels do not simply transpose into fictional form the polemical rhetoric of her essays; rather they develop what I have described elsewhere as a 'rhetoric of feeling' which simultaneously or by turns represents and explores the complex actualities of women's lives and figures utopian desires" (140).

14. This distinction would have resonated bitterly in the context of current marriage law debates. Fathers retained custody of children, including the right to assign them to guardians other than their mothers, and not until the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1886 could a mother gain custody even upon the father's death. In 1886 also for the first time a woman was permitted custody of children under twelve if the father's violence was sufficiently protracted and extreme as to constitute a threat to their lives. The notion died hard that males, unless proved patently irresponsible and unfit, owned their families.

15. 2d ed. (London: William Reeves, 1903). References to this edition are indicated by page number or numbers within parentheses.

Swiney's other writings included *The Cosmic Procession, or the Feminine Principle in Evolution* (London: Ernest Bell, 1906); *The Bar of Isis; or, the Law of the Mother* (London: Open Road Publishing Company, 1907); *The Mystery of the Circle and the Cross, or, the Interpretation of Sex* (London: Open Road Publishing Company, 1908); *The Esoteric Teaching of the Gnostics* (London: Yellon, Williams, 1909); *Women and Natural Law* (London: C. W. Daniel, 1912); and *Women among the Nations: A Short Treatise* (London, 1913).

16. 152 (July 1899): 69.

17. April 17, 1900, p. 132.

18. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).

19. Elizabeth Gould Davis, *The First Sex* (New York: Putnam, 1971); Heide Gottner-Abendrott, *Matriarchal Mythology in Former Times and Today* (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing Press, 1987); Rita M. Gross, *Feminism and Religion: An Introduction* (Boston: Beacon, 1996). See also Miriam Dexter, *Whence the Goddesses* (New York: Pergamon, 1990); Meredith Powers, *The Heroine in Western Literature* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1991); and Anne Jensen, *God's Self-Confident Daughters: Early Christianity and the Liberation of Women*, trans. O. C. Dean, Jr. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996).

20. Michele Barrett, *Women's Oppression Today: The Marxist/Feminist Encounter* (London: Verso, 1980); Alison Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988).

21. Susan Brownmiller, *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975); Catharine MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

22. Mary Daly, *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation* (Boston: Beacon, 1973); Daly, *Gyn/ecology, the Metaethics of Radical Feminism* (Boston: Beacon, 1978); and Daly, *Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon, 1984); Susan Griffin, *Woman and Nature: The Roaring inside Her* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Carol Christ, *Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest* (Boston: Beacon, 1980, 1995); and Christ, *Laughter of Aphrodite: Reflections on a Journey to the Goddess* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987). See also Carol Ochs, *Women and Spirituality* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983).

23. Jean Elshtain, *Just War Theory* (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Elshtain, *Women and War* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); and Elshtain, *Women, Militarism, and War: Essays in History, Politics, and Social Theory* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990); Carolyn Merchant, *Earthcare: Women and the Environment* (New York: Routledge, 1995). See also Grace Paley, *Long Walks and Intimate Talks* (New York: Feminist Press and the City University of New York, 1991); Birgit Brock-Utne, *Educating for Peace: A Feminist Perspective* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985); and Cambridge Women's Peace Collective, *My Country Is the Whole World: An Anthology of Women's Work on Peace and War* (London: Pandora, 1984).

## Non-European Contexts