

Catherine Macaulay's Letters on Education (1790):
An Early Feminist Polemic

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The woman of the greatest ability, undoubtedly, that this country has ever produced. -- And yet this woman has been suffered to die without a sufficient respect being paid to her memory.

Posterity, however, will be more just; and remember that Catherine Macaulay was an example of intellectual acquirements supposed to be incompatible with the weakness of her sex. (Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 163, 164)

Despite Wollstonecraft's prediction posterity has not been just to the memory of Catherine Macaulay; few intellectuals of equal merit have been as thoroughly forgotten as this broad-minded, scholarly, and reforming historian. The only comprehensive article in print on Macaulay written in this century,¹ Lucy Martin Donnelly's "The Celebrated Mrs. Macaulay", deprecates her later works, and finds one of the more tedious of them to be the Letters on Education:

Not that, as the word goes nowadays, Mrs. Macaulay's works are readable -- least of all her Treatise on the Immutability of Moral Truth and Letters on Education, written late in life and now only to be ferreted out in the British Museum. (Donnelly, 174)

But if Macaulay's Treatise on the Immutability of Moral Truth now seems abstruse, this is because few read theology of any kind, not because her work lacks reasonableness, quickness of argumentation and a kind of clear practicality often absent from such treatises. The Letters on Education, however, are still more unjustly neglected. Although their influence on Wollstonecraft's A Vindication is generally granted, it has never been fully documented. In addition, the Letters merit

1 It should be noted that Barbara Schnorrenberg of the University of North Carolina is now preparing a biography of Macaulay; she has also written an interesting and sympathetic biographical essay, "Catherine Macaulay Graham: The Rise and Fall of the Female Intellectual".

notice for their original opinions on an idiosyncratic range of social questions, and for their equably flowing, epigrammatical and at times sarcastic style. Macaulay combined intense love of argument with fairness in the presentation of counter-argument, but held above all the anomalous conviction that women perceived and thought as other human beings. Other eighteenth and nineteenth century writers -- Wollstonecraft, Thompson, Mill -- championed the cause of women with greater fervor and effort, but Macaulay was unique in her categorical denial of innate sexual differences. For this reason alone the Letters should be considered with A Vindication among the most significant early feminist documents.

Why have they been ignored?² Mainly because, with A Vindication, they were swiftly buried in the reaction which succeeded the radicalism of the early 1790's; few early nineteenth century readers were interested in Enlightenment prescriptions for educational reform. Macaulay remained an isolated figure in intellectual history, despite conversations with distinguished writers and politicians, in large part because almost no other Enlightenment theorists held feminist views. Unlike Mary Wollstonecraft she could not be revived as an early Romantic -- her prose lacks the energetic sensibility and dramatic quality of Wollstonecraft's more literary style -- nor as wife, mother, and mother-in-law of Romantics. Further, the title Letters on Education is minimally descriptive, suggesting neither Macaulay's energetic biases nor the comprehensiveness of her notion of education.

The book's full title, Letters on Education with Observations on Religious and Metaphysical Subjects, suggests another difficulty; Letters in fact contains three separate books, each well-written and unified, but unlikely to appeal to the same reader. Part I, 234 pages, is in effect the real "letters on education", discussing an ideal pattern of instruction from infancy onward, with digressive comments on the proper environment for young people, the equality of the sexes, and romantic love. It was this portion which clearly influenced

2 When attempting in 1971 to borrow a copy of the Letters through Inter-Library Loan, I was told no North American copies were available for circulation, and a microfilm would cost forty dollars. Garland Publishers have now issued a reprint (ed. Gina Luria, New York, 1974), and the Letters will undoubtedly receive more attention.

Wollstonecraft, already the author of a treatise on how to rear young women, and whose Vindication could have been more prosaically titled, "Essays on the Education of Women". Part II of the Letters, pages 235-336, might have been more accurately titled "Letters on Society"; in it Macaulay lovingly traces the defects and accomplishments of the Athenian, Spartan, and Roman civilizations, then sets forth the improvements she would like to see in contemporary government, art, penal law, even gardening. It is an unusual book which reveals strong imagination and distress at some of the more perverse brutalities of eighteenth century England, but also naivete about the motives of rulers and actual prospects for change; she well represents both the rationally benevolent aspects of Whig history and economics, and its ineffectuality in the face of human greed and inequity. Part III, pages 332-507, is a revision of her earlier Treatise on the Immutability of Moral Truth (1783), in which she vigorously attacked Bolingbroke's deism as a casuistical system for keeping the masses subservient and justifying divine (and therefore human) indifference to human suffering.

The Letters are part of an extended Enlightenment debate on education, and Macaulay refers frequently to her predecessors, Locke (Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 1696), Rousseau (Emile, 1762), Madame de Genlis (Adèle et Théodore, 1782), Fénelon (Traité de l'Education des Filles, 1687), and Helvétius (De l'Homme, des ses facultés intellectuelles et de son education), carefully recording her agreements and divergences of opinion. She is naturally preoccupied therefore with many of the same topics -- how to preserve health, when and how to punish, how to encourage intellectual curiosity and independence of character. She shares several assumptions with Locke, Rousseau, and de Genlis: children should not be beaten, they should not be encouraged in luxury or permitted to depend on servants; like theirs, her preferences are given the authority of "nature". Her position is intermediate between Locke's training in rational self-discipline and Rousseau's laissez-faire "naturalism", perhaps with more affinities toward the former; she is more lenient than Locke, more programmatic and bibliophilic than Rousseau.

With one significant perception, however, Macaulay widened enormously the constituency of the educator. Locke had made minimal gestures in the direction of education for women:

And although greater regard be to be had to beauty in the daughters, yet I will take the liberty to say, that the more they are in the air, without prejudice

to their faces, the stronger and healthier they will be; and the nearer they come to the hardships of their brothers in their education, the greater advantage will they receive from it, all the remaining part of their lives. (Locke, 110)

Rousseau's smug irrationalism condemned women to the even more restricted fate of ignorant sexual object and servant. Macaulay, by contrast, outlined the first system of education intended for both sexes of humanity:

The moderns, in the education of their children, have too much followed the stiff and prudish manners of ancient days, in the separating the male and female children of a family. This is well adapted to the absurd unsocial rigour of Grecian manners; but as it is not so agreeable to that mixture of the sexes in a more advanced age, which prevails in all European societies, it is not easy to be accounted for, but from the absurd notion, that the education of females should be of an opposite kind to that of males. (46, 47)

Macaulay's mind turned with most emphasis to the raising of daughters; her only child had been a daughter (of all the Enlightenment educational theorists, only she and de Genlis had actually raised a child), and the conventions for raising women seemed to her particularly repellent. Like Wollstonecraft and other moralists, she advocated the cultivation of health above beauty, but unlike Wollstonecraft she argues that the two qualities can in fact be identified:

... even on the subject of beauty, I confess to you, that I differ so much with the crowd, as to believe, that if there is such a reality in nature as beauty, it must consist of symmetry and proportion. A foot too small for the size of the body, is, in my eye, rather a deformity than a beauty; it shows bad nursing almost as much as the rickets; it carries the imagination to all those disagreeable and painful inequalities which are attendant on tight shoes. (43)

Here Macaulay attacks an eighteenth century practice of retarding the growth of girls' feet with unnaturally tight shoes, rising to one of her balanced sarcasms:

And if littleness alone, independent of proportion, constitutes the beauty of feet, we can never pretend

to vie with the Chinese, whilst we preserve the privilege of walking. Nature, if you do not restrain her, or turn her out of her course, is equal to the task both of fashioning the beauty of the person, and confirming the strength of the constitution (44)

At this point she launches into a four-page defense of co-education, anticipating her later comments on the need for equal education for women. The separation of the sexes is a corrupting legacy from the ancients, and the disabilities that result hurt women severely:

How many nervous diseases have been contracted? How much feebleness of constitution has been acquired, by forming a false idea of female excellence, and endeavouring, by our art, to bring Nature to the ply of our imagination. (47)

While physical exercise is commonly encouraged in boys, it is reproved as indecorous in girls -- "every vigorous exertion is suppressed" and "mind and body yield to the tyranny of error" (47). The resulting ill-health of adult women affects not only their children's health but their own character.

I could turn the other side of the argument, and show you, that most of the caprices, the teasing follies, and often the vices of women, proceed from weakness, or some other defect in their corporeal frame (48)

Macaulay's argument that the 'vices' of women are consequences of physical weakness was one of the central arguments available to Wollstonecraft and to the defenders of women's rights in the next century, but it was a treacherous one: overemphasis on physical frailty of women often abetted the belief that an innate sexual difference was the cause. Since Macaulay does not appear to be an overly censorious witness, her statements on the health of eighteenth century middle-class women are depressing in themselves, and the devastating effects of childbearing and gynecological ignorance doubtless lie behind them. Like Wollstonecraft, she is disgusted by the affectation of weakness:

My arguments may serve only to strengthen my ideas, and my sex will continue to lisp with their tongues, to totter in their walk, and to counterfeit more weakness and sickness than they really have, in order to attract the notice of the male; for, says a very elegant

author, perfection is not the proper object of love: we admire excellence; but we are more enclined to love those we despise. (48)

The "very elegant author" to whom she refers is Edmund Burke, who in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1756) had belabored a definition of feminine beauty as a combination of smoothness, smallness, timidity, delicacy, and weakness:

... so far is perfection, considered as such, from being the cause of beauty; that this quality, where it is highest in the female sex, almost always carries with it an idea of weakness and imperfection. Women are very sensible of this; for which reason, they learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, to counterfeit weakness, and even sickness. In all this, they are guided by nature. Beauty in distress is much the most affecting beauty. Blushing has little less power; and modesty in general, which is a tacit allowance of imperfection, is itself considered as an amiable quality, and certainly heightens every other that is so. (Burke, 110)

... but love approaches much nearer to contempt than is commonly imagined (Burke, 67)

Burke's obsession with the pleasing, relaxing, melting, and delicate physical sensations no doubt angered the rigorous author of Letters, a firm advocate of a return to early Roman vigor and simplicity of manners. His smirking condescension likewise angered Mary Wollstonecraft, who criticized him briefly in A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) and at greater length in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1791).

Even more harmful than proscription of female physical vigor, Macaulay continues, is the violent prejudice against intellectual training for women, such as "can only suit with the notion of a positive inferiority in the intellectual powers of the female mind" (49). Like Wollstonecraft she emphasizes that even the social duties of wife, daughter, and mother are best performed by persons of good understanding and education. Further, while women should be granted a serious education, some of the relaxing pursuits and arts formerly imposed on girls should be accorded to boys as well:

Confine not the education of your daughters to what is regarded as the ornamental parts of it, nor deny the graces to your sons. (50)

She enthusiastically eulogizes needlework (a mild surprise), and wishes to extend such handicrafts to men:

... I would rather see my pupils engaged in the innocent employment of forming a button, than in spending whole days in hunting down a harmless animal, both at the hazard of their necks, and at the expense of their benevolence. (65)

Here she glances off Rousseau, who had advocated hunting to distract his growing male from the allurements of women.

Anticipating Wollstonecraft, Macaulay expatiates on the advantages of the still quite radical notion of coeducation. Among other things, she argues, educating both sexes together eliminates the smothered prurience cultivated by unfamiliarity with members of the opposite sex:

By the uninterrupted intercourse which you will thus establish, both sexes will find, that friendship may be enjoyed between them without passion ... even at the age of desire, objects of temptation will lose somewhat of their stimuli, by losing their novelty. Your sons will look for something more solid in women, than a mere outside; and be no longer the dupes to the meanest, the weakest, and most profligate of the sex. They will become the constant benefactors of that part of their family who stand in need of their assistance; and in regard to all matters of domestic concern, the unjust distinction of primogeniture will be deprived of its sting. (50)

Macaulay took as given throughout the Letters the legal precedence of men over women; under the existing order, the best ameliorative she could imagine was an education as egalitarian as that order would allow.

While discussing the contemporary love of ornament and showy accomplishments (which, needless to say, she finds excessive), Macaulay begins an unexpectedly bitter polemic on the aims of contemporary women's education:

But as the entire neglect of our immediate ancestors in the education of their daughters, has left us unshackled by old rules, we can model them according to the true standard of modern taste. We can make

them mistresses of the fine arts; and render them equally capable of captivating, by their accomplishments, the eastern despot, or the European fine gentleman. These are delightful privileges; but I own to you, that my pride and my prejudices lead me to regard my sex in a higher light than as the mere objects of sense. I would dispense with some of those dazzling accomplishments, in order to preserve to them that rank which God has given them among his creatures. (61, 62)

In several respects this passage mocks Rousseau and foreshadows Wollstonecraft in its contempt for the trivial, its perception that some forms of 'elevation' granted to women by aristocratic husbands and lovers ("oriental despots") are actually debasement, and its religious protest that women are, after all, the creatures of God not men.

Only one direct reference to sex occurs in Letters; she gloomily maintains that a law of diminishing satisfactions inevitably governs sexual pleasure:

... there are limits to which the intense pleasures soon arrive, and from which they ever afterwards decline, they are by necessity of short duration; and if we endeavor to compensate for such limitations by the frequency of repetition, we shall lose more than we gain by the fatigue of our faculties, and the diminution of sensibility.

Nor is it the sensual voluptuary only who has to lament in the decay of his faculties, the importunity of desires which can never be gratified, and the memory of pleasures which must return no more. No, the mentalist ... also will find his capabilities fall infinitely beneath his desires. (75, 76)

The Vindication echoes similar views on sexuality at greater length; Wollstonecraft had not yet begun her liason with Gilbert Imlay, and it is not impossible that her opinions were reinforced by those of Macaulay. Her asperity on the subject may also have been heightened by her acceptance of the notion that 'weakness' was an inherent part of female sexual attractiveness.

Letters XXI-XXIV are the most striking sources for Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. The disabilities of women seem to have been of all subjects closest to Macaulay's emotions; in these letters her writing

suddenly improves, her digressions vanish, her sarcasms become pithy, and her latent practicality asserts itself. These final chapters of Part I are the climax of the entire treatise, and contain an overwhelming array of parallels -- in language, tone, mode of argument, sentence style, even specific quotations -- to Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Almost two centuries later it is immediately clear why Wollstonecraft was impressed by this portion of Macaulay's treatise.

Like Wollstonecraft, Macaulay asserts the fundamental principle that virtue must be identical for both sexes: "true virtue in one sex must be equally so in the other" (Letters, 201). Morality cannot be sex-linked; "knowledge is equally necessary to both sexes in the pursuit of happiness" (201); women as well as men must progress within this life in readiness for a future state (201, 202). Like Wollstonecraft Macaulay believes that men are naturally stronger than women (206) and would permit them more robust sports (142), though unlike Wollstonecraft she is willing to commit herself to the proposition that there are no other differences, in intellect, sexuality, or constitution:

... all those vices and imperfections which have been generally regarded as inseparable from the female character, do not in any manner proceed from sexual causes, but are entirely the effects of situation and education. (202)

Recognition of repeated childbirth as an 'effect of situation suffices to reconcile this statement with the one on health quoted above; since nineteenth century British reformers tacitly conceded the possibility of such innate qualities, Macaulay's environmentalism led her to a position maintained by almost no one else till the twentieth century.

Like Wollstonecraft Macaulay bristles at the charge that a learned education would distract women from their 'duties' (202): far more harmful is the ignorance which fosters frivolous amusements and intrigues. Though her attacks on the irresponsible behavior of women educated under present methods are less lengthy than Wollstonecraft's, they have the same bitter intensity:

... you know there is but one ~~fault~~ which a woman of honour may not commit with impunity; let her only take care that she is not caught in a love intrigue, and

she may lie, she may deceive, she may defame, she may ruin her own family with gaming, and the peace of twenty others with her coquetry, and yet preserve both her reputation and her peace. These are glorious privileges, Hortensia; but whilst plays and novels are the favorite study of the fair, whilst the admiration of men continues to be set forth as the chief honour of woman, whilst power is only acquired by personal charms, whilst continual dissipation banishes the hour of reflection, Nature and flattery will too often prevail (210, 211)

Both women feel that if power is not directly granted it will be grasped indirectly, with invidious consequences (213, 214); both ascribe the belief in male superiority to women's debased condition (204), male vanity (205), and the flattery by which an oppressed group seeks petty favors from its captors. Macaulay rebukes the practice of calling a vigorous mind "masculine" (204), a point which Wollstonecraft repeats with direct reference to Macaulay herself:

I will not call hers a masculine understanding, because I admit not such an arrogant assumption of reason; but I contend that it was a sound one, and that her judgement, the matured fruit of profound thinking, was a proof that a woman can acquire judgement, in the full extent of the word. (Wollstonecraft, 1967, 164)

Both attack the double standard and the severe treatment of "fallen women" by other women; both assert that sexual sins are inappropriately made the sole standard of female conduct, and that, contrary to harsh and self-fulfilling popular opinion, transgressors can reform. Both advocate a rational teaching of chastity to women -- the necessity of increased female chastity is given great weight by Wollstonecraft -- and accept the "female influence" theory, asserting that until women are reformed society cannot be. Both lacerate convention and social hypocrisy in sexual matters, attack the practice of keeping women in sexual ignorance (207) and oppose sexual secrecy in general. Perhaps more important, both complain of women's complete civil disability:

For with a total and absolute exclusion of every political right to the sex in general, married women, whose situation demand [sic] a particular indulgence, have

hardly a civil right to save them from the grossest injuries (210)

Wollstonecraft adds the bold and striking idea that (perhaps) women should vote and sit in parliamentary assemblies. Both notice wryly that if European women are not as abjectly enslaved as their Eastern equivalents, the difference is one of degree. Macaulay's exordium to Letter XXIII could have served as an epigraph to A Vindication:

... when the sex have been taught wisdom by education, they will be glad to give up indirect influence for rational privileges; and the precarious sovereignty of an hour enjoyed with the meanest and most infamous of the species, for those established rights which, independent of accidental circumstances, may afford protection to the whole sex. (215)

She even speaks of the "vindication of female nature" (214).

The most striking correlations are in the citation of chauvinist authors; Macaulay quotes pronouncements of Rousseau and Chesterfield which are later attacked by Wollstonecraft, and both use of necessity the mordant tone of someone forced to refute self-refuting arguments. Both are particularly incensed by Chesterfield's claim that women are children with whom no wise man will discuss his affairs (209) and Rousseau's assertion that female charm was granted women in order that they might compensate for weakness with deceit (205); both regard coldly his explanation that two sexual opposites comprise one moral unit:

... he has made up a moral person of the union of the two sexes, which, for contradiction and absurdity, outdoes every metaphysical riddle that was ever formed in the schools. (206)

It is not impossible that reading Macaulay's quotations prompted Wollstonecraft to examine the originals; at any rate, her fuller, more energetic refutation of Rousseau and other proscriptive male authors is the liveliest chapter of A Vindication.

In summary, both the Macaulay letters and Wollstonecraft's A Vindication possess a similar mixture of vigorous if inchoate feminism, bitter sarcasm, and staunch piety. Wollstonecraft expressed sorrow that Macaulay was unable to live to read A Vindication, and acknowledged the extensive nature of her debt to her:

Coinciding in opinion with Mrs. Macaulay relative to many branches of education, I refer to her valuable work, instead of quoting her sentiments to support my own. (Wollstonecraft, 1967, fn.)

In the same passage she mixes praise for Macaulay's cogency of argumentation with gentle criticism of her style:

Possessing more penetration than sagacity, more understanding than fancy, she writes with sober energy and argumentative closeness; yet sympathy and benevolence give an interest to her sentiments, and that vital heat to arguments, which forces the reader to weigh them. (Wollstonecraft, 1967, 164)

Macaulay is noticeably more restrained than Wollstonecraft in her attacks on female vices, more conscious of causes and less incensed at effects; she led a solitary and thoroughly prosperous life, and suffered less immediately from human perversity than did Wollstonecraft. Their political differences are exemplified by Wollstonecraft's greater concern with middle-class education and the position of governesses, and her preoccupation with the French Revolution and military occupation. Macaulay, by contrast, glances backward at Locke and Rousseau (and, of course, her own upbringing) in her concern for the individually tutored child, and at de Genlis and Fenelon in her interest (in Letter XXV) in the education of an ideal prince. The middle-class radicals who, with Wollstonecraft, wrote for Joseph Johnson's printing establishment, held no hope for social reform from an enlightened monarchy or autocracy, but sought instead the reformation and enfranchisement of their own class. It remained for Wollstonecraft to emphasize Macaulay's feminism as a separate topic, associate with it the revolutionary belief in human equality, and condemn the ironic limitations of the phrase, "rights of man".

Suggested Reading List

Brulart de Genlis, Stephanie. (1796) ADELAIDE AND THEODORE; OR, LETTERS ON EDUCATION: CONTAINING ALL THE PRINCIPLES RELATIVE TO THREE DIFFERENT PLANS OF EDUCATION; TO THAT OF PRINCES, AND TO THOSE OF YOUNG PERSONS OF BOTH SEXES. Translated from the French of Madame la

Comtess De Genlis. 4th edition. 3 vols. T. Cadell, London.

_____. (1782) ADELE ET THEODORE, OU LETTRES SUR L'EDUCATION: CONTENANT TOUS LES PRINCIPES RELATIFS AUX TROIX DIFFERENS PLANS D'EDUCATION DES PRINCES, DES JEUNES PERSONNES, ET DES HOMMES. 3 tom. Paris.

An epistolary novel containing three educational plans; that for Adelaide receives the most emphasis. Although Madame de Genlis accepts many of Fénelon's restrictions on the social role and mental life of women, Adelaide is nonetheless given a reasonably careful education in the liberal arts. Among other recommended books, she reads Macaulay's History of England.

Burke, Edmund. (1958) A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL, ed. and intro. with notes by J. T. Boulton. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

Pertinent sections include:

Part I, Section I, "Of Beauty"

Part II, Section V, "Power"

Part III, Section I, "Of Beauty"

Section IX, "Perfection not the cause of BEAUTY"

Section XIII, "Beautiful Objects Small"

Section XIV, "Smoothness"

Section XVI, "Delicacy"

Section XVIII, "Recapitulation"

Locke, John. (1968) THE EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE: A CRITICAL EDITION WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES, by James L. Axtell. Cambridge University Press, London.

Citations are to this edition.

_____. (1964) SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION. Abridged and with an introduction and commentary by F. W. Garforth. Barron's Educational Series, Woodbury, New York.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. (1762) EMILE; OU, DE L'EDUCATION. 4 tom. J. Neaulme, Amsterdam, 1762.

_____. (1911) EMILE, trans. Barbara Foxley. With an introduction by Andre Boutet de Monvel. Dent, London.

Advocates training in sensory abilities and practical ingenuity; abhors early booklearning, memorization of languages, use of abstract words. Insists children cannot reason, experience passions, or understand good and evil, and should therefore be persuaded through their greed. Though treated leniently they should always sense the dominance of their tutors.

Salignac de la Mothe Fenelon, Francois de. (1966) FENELON ON EDUCATION: A TRANSLATION OF THE 'TRAITE DE L'EDUCATION DES FILLES' AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING FENELON'S EDUCATIONAL THEORIES AND PRACTICE. With introduction and notes by H. C. Barnard. Columbia University Press.

Wollstonecraft, Mary. (1790) "Letters on Education." THE ANALYTICAL REVIEW, vol. 8 (November, 1790), 241-254.

_____. (1962) A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN, edited with an intro. and notes by Charles W. Hageman, Jr. W. W. Norton, New York.

Biographical Sources:

The two principal biographical sources are the DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, vol. 12, 407-409, and Lucy Martin Donnelly's "The Celebrated Mrs. Macaulay", WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY, vol. 6 (1949), 173-207, both of which contain useful bibliographical notes. Also see Mary Hays, (1803) FEMALE BIOGRAPHY, Phillips, London, vol. 5, 287-307, and the summary treatments in Ida Beatrice O'Malley, (1933) WOMEN IN SUBJECTION: A STUDY OF THE LIVES OF ENGLISHWOMEN BEFORE 1832, Duckworth, London, and Doris Mary Stenton, (1957) ENGLISH WOMEN IN HISTORY, Allen and Unwin, London.

Macaulay's Other Works:

(Arranged Chronologically)

1. (1763-1783) HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I TO THAT OF THE BRUNSWICK LINE. J. Nourse, London. Vol. 1, 1763; vol. 2, 1766; vol. 3, 1767; vol. 4, 1768; vol. 5, 1771; vol. 6, 1781; vol. 7, 1781; vol. 8, 1783.
2. (1767) LOOSE REMARKS ON CERTAIN POSITIONS TO BE FOUND IN MR. HOBBS' "PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY".
3. (1770) OBSERVATIONS ON A PAMPHLET [by Edmund Burke] ENTITLED "THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS". Edward and Charles Dilly, London.
4. (1774) A MODEST PLEA FOR THE PROPERTY OF COPYRIGHT.
5. (1775) AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND ON THE PRESENT IMPORTANT CRISIS OF AFFAIRS. Bath.
6. (1778) THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT TIME, IN A SERIES OF LETTERS. Vol. 1. R. Cruttwell, Bath.
7. (1783) A TREATISE ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF MORAL TRUTH, London.
8. (1790) OBSERVATIONS ON THE REFLECTIONS OF THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, IN A LETTER TO THE EARL OF STANHOPE.